Handbook on decentralization, devolution and the state
In: Elgar handbooks in political science
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In: Elgar handbooks in political science
In: Working papers 253
In: Political science research and methods: PSRM, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 416-425
ISSN: 2049-8489
AbstractI rely on data from 31,754 electoral districts in the United States from 1834 until 2016 to explore how the nationalization of politics occurs within districts. I argue that in the early stages of the American democracy local concerns were more prominent in the distant districts from the capital city than in the nearby districts, and therefore the number of parties was greater in the former than in the latter. However, these differences vanished after the New Deal, when authority was centralized. Nationalization reduced the number of parties everywhere, but above all in the most distant district from Washington, D.C.
In: Acta politica: AP ; international journal of political Science, Band 57, Heft 4, S. 753-771
ISSN: 1741-1416
In: Frontiers in political science, Band 3
ISSN: 2673-3145
Electoral rules are a crucial institutional factor shaping the entry and success of new parties. However, testing how they affect voting behavior is problematic when using observational data in cross-national studies. As district magnitude is usually correlated with politically salient features affecting the likelihood of voting for new (and small) parties, the latent support of small parties differs across electoral systems. Using a quasi-experimental design in Spain focused on the district viability of a new party,Vox, in two elections held within 196 days, I provide a more robust estimate of the impact of electoral systems on the success of new parties. Strong evidence that the electoral system makes a difference for new parties has been identified: strategic considerations found in the districts whereVoxwas not successful prevented a significant number of voters from supporting the party.
In: Frontiers in Political Science, Band 1
ISSN: 2673-3145
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 16, Heft 4, S. 1211-1213
ISSN: 1541-0986
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 25, Heft 2, S. 221-226
ISSN: 1460-3683
In this research note, I revisit the conventional wisdom about when the psychological effect of electoral systems is observed. I rely on data from the first presidential and legislative elections in 45 third- and fourth-wave presidential and semi-presidential regimes to show that the psychological effect of electoral systems manifests itself in the first election. The effective number of legislative parties is significantly higher than the effective number of presidential candidates in the first election when the electoral system in legislative elections is more permissive than in presidential elections.
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 18, Heft 5, S. 653-665
ISSN: 1460-3683
Relying on data from a natural experiment in Spain, I produce an unbiased estimate of the extent to which strategic voting occurs in multi-member districts. I show that voters have fully adapted to the different incentives provided by distinctive electoral systems in Spain since the first election and also that they behave strategically only when the opportunity to do so is present. That is, contamination effects do not seem to exist when voting strategically. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 18, Heft 5, S. 653-666
ISSN: 1354-0688
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 18, Heft 5, S. 653-665
ISSN: 1460-3683
Relying on data from a natural experiment in Spain, I produce an unbiased estimate of the extent to which strategic voting occurs in multi-member districts. I show that voters have fully adapted to the different incentives provided by distinctive electoral systems in Spain since the first election and also that they behave strategically only when the opportunity to do so is present. That is, contamination effects do not seem to exist when voting strategically.
In: Revista española de ciencia política, Heft 21, S. 9-23
ISSN: 1575-6548
Studies of electoral law consequences typically accept that the number of parties running in a district decreases (increases) as district magnitude decreases (increases). This impact rests on a key behavioral assumption: parties respond to the seats to be filled in each district (as if they were) in isolation. In this paper I demonstrate that this assumption does not hold due to the incentives for the nationalization of parties and party systems. Therefore, the role of district magnitude in determining the number of parties in an electoral system is not as decisive as the conventional wisdom assumes. Adapted from the source document.
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 31-49
ISSN: 1460-3683
The process of formation of electoral expectations in proportional representation systems is analysed in this article. Contrary to Duvergerian or electoral coordination theories, by using survey and in-depth elite interview data from Spain in the 1970s and 1980s, it is shown that strategic voting depends on heuristics (i.e. extrapolations from the previous election) rather than on rational expectations. The main implication is that strategic voting is possible in large districts.
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 31-50
ISSN: 1354-0688
In: Revista española de ciencia política, Heft 11, S. 191-192
ISSN: 1575-6548